The Correct Route after Rejection of Plaint

Once a plaint is rejected under Order VII Rule 11, it ceases to remain on the file of the Court. In other words, such rejection is not merely a procedural order; it has substantive consequences. Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines a “decree” as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. The definition clause expressly provides that a decree “shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint.”

Thus, by virtue of the statutory definition itself, rejection of a plaint amounts to a decree. Once the rejection is treated as a decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC, the appellate provision contained in Section 96 CPC becomes immediately attracted. Section 96(1) CPC provides that, save where otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie from every decree passed by a Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorized to hear appeals from its decisions. Accordingly, since rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) is deemed to be a decree, and there is no express statutory exclusion of appeal in such cases, a regular First Appeal under Section 96 CPC lies against the said order. The remedy is therefore by way of appeal from decree, and not by way of an original writ petition, unless exceptional circumstances warrant invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction.

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However, a contrary line of reasoning has historically been advanced based on Section 104 CPC and Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC. Section 104(1) provides that an appeal shall lie from the orders enumerated therein and, save as otherwise expressly provided, from no other orders. Similarly, Order XLIII Rule 1 specifies particular orders which are appealable, such as an order under Order VII Rule 10 returning a plaint, but does not expressly mention an order under Order VII Rule 11 rejecting a plaint. Relying on this omission, certain courts had earlier taken the view that since rejection under Order VII Rule 11 is not enumerated under Section 104 or Order XLIII Rule 1, no appeal would lie and the order would not be appealable as an “order.”

On this construction, rejection under Order VII Rule 11 is treated as an order not falling within the appealable category. Consequently, the absence of an express appellate provision is taken to indicate legislative intent to exclude a regular appeal. In such circumstances, the remedy is said to lie not by way of first appeal, but by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Under this approach, the High Court may examine jurisdictional errors, procedural irregularities, or patent illegality in the order of rejection. Thus, the writ remedy is viewed as the appropriate corrective mechanism in place of a statutory appeal.

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A third line of reasoning suggests that a revision under Section 115 CPC is maintainable against rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. Section 115 empowers the High Court to call for the record of any case decided by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies, and to interfere where the subordinate court has exercised jurisdiction not vested in it, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or acted illegally or with material irregularity. Under this view, if rejection under Order VII Rule 11 is treated as non-appealable, a revision would lie, provided the jurisdictional conditions are satisfied. However, subsection (2) of Section 115 restricts this power by prohibiting interference where an appeal lies.

Recent Views of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

In P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. (2025 INSC 598) Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025, on 29 April 2025
(Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J. and R. Mahadevan, J.) has laid following considerations:

The Supreme Court was examining whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground of limitation, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. Although the case did not directly frame the question whether an appeal under Section 96 CPC or a writ under Article 227 lies against rejection of plaint, the reasoning adopted by the Court has direct implications on that controversy.

In para 14, the Supreme Court clearly held:

“The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the trial court’s order.”

The Court nowhere suggests that Article 227 is the correct remedy. The judgment discusses only the High Court’s exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, and not Article 227 at any stage. In para 14 (page 20–21), the Supreme Court expressly states that the High Court “while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered…”. The Court critiques the scope of revision but does not suggest that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 was the appropriate alternative. Nowhere in paras 10–15 (pages 10–21) is Article 227 mentioned as a permissible or preferred remedy. The omission, especially while analysing the propriety of High Court interference, indicates that the Court treated the matter strictly within the CPC appellate/revisional framework, not writ jurisdiction.

The statutory discussion revolves around Order VII Rule 11, Section 115 CPC, and Article 59 of the Limitation Act, but not Order 43 appeals. In para 14 (page 20–21), the Court addresses the limits of revisional jurisdiction, yet does not indicate that the order is appealable under Order 43. Since Order 43 governs appealable “orders” and the Court never categorises O7R11 rejection as such, the omission supports the inference that it was treated as a decree. The complete absence of any discussion on Order 43 in a case squarely dealing with rejection of plaint suggests that the remedy framework was understood to lie outside Section 104/Order 43.

In P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani & Ors. (2026 INSC 121) Civil Appeal No. 739 of 2026, on 03 February 2026
(Bench: Aravind Kumar, J. and N.V. Anjaria, J.) has laid following considerations:

In Para 7.4 (Page 24–25), the Court clearly holds that once specific provision under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is available, the High Court cannot exercise Article 227 to reject or strike off plaint. In Para 8 (Page 25), it emphasizes that legislative intent must be respected where a specific remedial mechanism exists. In Para 9 (Page 25–26), availability of alternative civil remedy under CPC is treated as a “complete and near total bar” on Article 227 jurisdiction. In Para 5.5.1 (Page 12), it specifically records that rejection of plaint amounts to a deemed decree appealable under Section 96 CPC. It recognizes O7R11 rejection as part of CPC’s self-contained mechanism.

The position in P. Suresh v. D. Kalaivani is much more explicit. The Supreme Court directly addressed whether Article 227 of the Constitution could be invoked to strike off a plaint when Order VII Rule 11 CPC provides a specific remedy. The Court held that the CPC is a self-contained code and that rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 amounts to a deemed decree within the meaning of Section 2(2) CPC. Consequently, such rejection is appealable under Section 96 CPC. The Court further held that the availability of a specific statutory remedy under the CPC operates as a “near total bar” to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. The High Court cannot supplant or bypass the statutory mechanism by invoking constitutional superintendence.

What finally emerges from a combined reading of the 2025 and 2026 decisions is a clarified and strengthened doctrinal position. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is a deemed decree and must be challenged by way of a regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be used as a substitute for the statutory appellate remedy, except in truly exceptional cases involving jurisdictional failure or grave miscarriage of justice. The Supreme Court has thus firmly reasserted procedural discipline: where the CPC provides a specific remedy, that remedy must be exhausted, and constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to circumvent the legislative scheme.